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Abstract
In this study we analyze the evolution of operating cost ineﬃciency
for the English and Welsh water industry over the period 1995-2001 by
estimating an heteroskedastic stochastic variable cost frontier. The main
aim of this paper is to provide an overall picture of the industry cost
ineﬃciency, as we consider both the water and sewerage companies and
the smaller water only companies. The main results of this paper are that
industry operating cost ineﬃciency has decreased over the sample period
and that ineﬃciency diﬀerentials among firms have steadily narrowed.
This pattern of ineﬃciency might have been generated by the incentives
provided by comparative and capital market competition which became
fully operative after the 1994 price review.
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1 Introduction
The English and Welsh water industry was privatized in 1989 and a new per-
manent regulatory framework was established. The main task of the new eco-
nomic regulator (Oﬃce of Water Services) was to protect customer interests,
to promote eﬃciency and to guarantee that water companies’ functions were
adequately financed. The regulatory regime set after privatization based on a
price cap methodology evolved over time. In 1995 the price cap formula was
modified in order to introduce yardstick competition in the industry: the new
regulatory scheme was expected to raise incentives and to reduce costs through
an indirect competition eﬀect. Moreover, at the end of 1994 institutional lim-
its to capital market competition were abolished: mergers and take-overs were
in general allowed for all water utilities, provided they did not prejudice the
regulator’s ability to apply comparative competition.
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Most academic studies on the English and Welsh water industry focus on the
analysis of the industry cost structure in order to evaluate the existence of scale
and scope economies. While some authors provide information on total factor
productivity measures, none analyses the evolution of industry cost eﬃciency
over time.
The main aim of this paper is to give an overall picture of industry operating
cost ineﬃciency over the period 1995-2001. In order to achieve this goal we
consider both the ten water and sewerage companies and the smaller water only
companies; in particular we focus only on the water supply service. Average
cost ineﬃciency is estimated by means of a stochastic cost frontier approach
modified in order to account for possible heteroskedasticity problems arising
from large size diﬀerentials which characterize water utilities in England and
Wales; furthermore, we allow the ineﬃciency component of the variable cost
function to depend on exogenous variables which are expected to influence cost
eﬃciency.
Empirical results suggest that water utilities have reduced cost ineﬃciency
over the sample period and that eﬃciency gaps among firms has steadily nar-
rowed. We argue that these findings might have been generated by the incen-
tives provided by comparative and capital market competition which became
fully operative after the 1994 price review.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the
reorganization process and the evolution of the regulatory framework which took
place in the water industry in England and Wales after privatization. In Section
3 the dataset employed in the empirical analysis is described and summary
statistics are discussed. Section 4 analyzes the modeling strategy and section 5
comments the empirical findings. Finally, section 6 concludes the paper.
2 Regulation of the water and sewerage indus-
try in England and Wales: relevant issues
Before 1973 the water and sewerage industry in England and Wales had a highly
fragmented structure, mainly organized on local basis. The 1973 Water Act re-
organized the industry and established ten state-owned regional water and sew-
erage authorities (RWAs) responsible for water supply, sewerage and environ-
mental services. Moreover, 29 privately owned water only companies (WOCs)
supplied water within the boundaries of the RWAs.
During the 80’s the quality of the service deteriorated and, in general, the
whole industry suﬀered from heavy underinvestment (Hunt and Lynk (1995))
because of harder budget constraints imposed by conservative governments.
In 1989 the RWAs were privatized and became publicly quoted water and
sewerage companies (WASCs)1; at the same time the existing constraints on
the WOCs’ financing and dividend policy were removed, transforming them
1Environmental regulation and river maintenance activity were transferred to a government
agency.
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into normal public limited liability companies. Privatization was expected to
improve the overall eﬃciency, to raise funds on the capital markets and to stim-
ulate enhancing quality investments2. Moreover, the 1986 Littlechild’s White
Paper on the water industry privatization suggested the possibility to facilitate
three possible forms of competition in the industry: comparative or yardstick
competition, capital market competition and, to a lesser extent, product mar-
ket competition. Nonetheless, given that the water and sewerage industry has
the characteristics of a "natural monopoly par excellence" (Littlechild (1986)),
privatization necessarily entailed the establishment of a permanent regulatory
framework.
The natural monopoly status of the water and sewerage industry comes
mainly from the establishment of the network of pipes and sewers whose costs
are huge and constitute a large fraction of total costs, so that it is often not
economical to duplicate the network in order to allow some product market
competition between companies. Moreover, the value of the service (i.e. water
or sewerage) is extremely low compared to the costs of the infrastructure and
it is rather expensive transferring water over long distances: thus, the usual
ways of introducing competition into network utilities (Newbery (1999)), like
the creation of a national grid and the liberalization of entry, or the introduction
of forms of common carriage3, are usually not believed to be either feasible or
particularly eﬃciency enhancing (Armstrong et al. (1994) and Cowan (1997))4.
Since 1989 the English and Welsh water and sewerage industry has been reg-
ulated by the Oﬃce of Water Services (Ofwat). Alongside with the basic tasks of
promoting eﬃciency, protecting customers and guaranteeing an adequate supply
of water and sewerage services on a non-discriminatory basis, the main duty of
Ofwat was to "secure that companies are able to finance the proper carrying out
of their functions (in particular by securing reasonable returns on their capital)"
(1989 Water Act); furthermore it should have promoted competition.
The chosen regulatory regime is based on an hybrid version of the well-
known RPI − X price cap formula (revised every five years), i.e. RPI+K,
where RPI is the retail price index, and K is composed by an eﬃciency factor
X, representing the amount by which each company has to reduce tariﬀs in real
terms, and a component Q, which reflects the expenditure necessary to meet
the higher quality levels set by the EC directive on water quality.
This formula contains elements typical of a rate of return regulation scheme,
2Economic rationales in favor of privatization are well known (see e.g. Vickers and Yarrow
(1988)). Actually, some authors suggest that competition may play a more important role
in stimulating eﬃciency than ownhership per se. See, among others, Sappington and Stiglitz
(1987), De Fraja (1993) and Newbery (1999).
3 In a common carriage system an incumbent company shares its network with a third party
to allow it to compete within the incumbent’s area in the provision of water and/or sewerage
services.
4Other possible forms of product market competition envisaged by the 1989 Water Act are
Inset appointments and cross border supply. The first consists in the possibility granted to a
water company to supply large users within another company area. Cross border competition
allows customers living close to the border of two nearby companies to switch supplier bearing
connection costs. Both forms of product market competition have had only very limited
applications (OFWAT (2000a) and Sawkins (2001)).
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which allows better incentives for the companies to undertake the needed in-
vestment programs5. Moreover, by allowing the determination of X to depend
on the relative eﬃciency of each firm with respect to the most eﬃcient one,
this regulation formula enables the introduction of yardstick competition6. Al-
though some forms of comparative competition had been called for by the 1989
Water Act, the lack of a comprehensive information infrastructure has delayed
its implementation till the first 1994 price review.
The theoretical underpinnings of yardstick competition can be traced back
to the works of Holmstrom (1982), Lazear and Rosen (1981) and Nalebuﬀ and
Stiglitz (1983); Shleifer in his 1985 seminal paper was the first to examine a
model of yardstick competition in a regulatory framework.
Yardstick competition is a regulatory regime which allows to reduce asym-
metric information between regulator and firms about the exact extension of
the feasible cost reductions: in this way it combines the power of the incentive
scheme to reduce costs of a pure price cap regulation method7, with the abil-
ity to induce allocative eﬃciency typical of a rate of return regulation scheme8
(Armstrong et al. (1994) and Beesley and Littlechild (1989)).
The basic idea underlying yardstick competition is to link the price every firm
is allowed to charge to some function of the costs of other firms in the industry.
Through an indirect competition eﬀect firms have large incentives to improve
cost eﬃciency, since they are residual claimant of the diﬀerence between their
costs and the industry yardstick. Moreover the incentives to cut costs do not
vanish before the regulatory review, because the price every firm is allowed to
charge at the beginning of the regulatory period is not based on firm’s own costs.
Finally, since all firms share the same incentives, it is reasonable to expect that,
at least in the medium run, all of them will try to improve their cost eﬃciency:
by the implementation of yardstick competition average industry costs should
decline over time and each firm’s costs should converge to the industry minimum.
The proper working of yardstick competition depends on diﬀerent issues:
the ability of the regulator to control for diﬀerent firms’ operating conditions
while evaluating cost diﬀerences among firms9, the assumption that firms do
5For a theoretical discussion see, among others, Laﬀont and Tirole (1993) and Armstrong
et al. (1994).
6 In order to prevent firms from reducing costs (thus improving their eﬃciency) through
quality reductions, OFWAT allows firms which perform better in terms of a set of quality
indicators (such as speed of repairs, number of breaks, ecc.) to have more generous caps.
7A pure price cap is a high-powered incentive scheme because the firm is residual claimant
of any cost saving in excess of X; on the other hand, the asymmetric information about
the maximum feasible cost reduction allows the firm to enjoy a rent, thus determining a
divergence between prices and costs (poor allocative eﬃciency). Moreover the incentives to
cut costs vanish before the end of the regulatory period because cost savings will be passed
on to consumers (ratchet eﬀect) at the following regulatory review.
8Under rate of return regulation prices are set by the regulator in order to let the firm
cover all its costs: in particular the firm is allowed to earn a reasonable rate of return on the
capital employed. Since prices are (at least in principle) re-set every time costs change, the
earnings of the company are made largely independent on its cost performance, thus giving
the firm poor incentives to cut costs. On the other hand, since prices closely track costs, this
regime induces allocative eﬃciency.
9Firms’ eﬃciency analysis is also sensible to the empirical methodology employed. On this
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not collude10 and the existence of a suﬃcient number of firms which allows
the regulator to make valid comparisons. The last issue may interfere with the
working of capital market competition if the number of firms in the industry is
relatively low, like in the English and Welsh water industry: in this case the
regulator may not allow some mergers or take-overs if they prejudice her ability
to compare firms’ eﬃciency.
As mentioned above, since the 1986 Littlechild’s White Paper on water in-
dustry privatization, capital market competition was believed to be a way of
introducing competitive pressure on regulated firms by means of the take-over
threat. The 1989 Water Act accepted this idea and set up some principles for
mergers and take-overs activities: basically they should not preclude Ofwat’s
ability to make comparisons among firms (Sawkins (2001))11 .
The first wave of take-over and merger activity in the English and Welsh
water industry was carried out after privatization and, subsequently, after the
1994 expiry of the golden share on the WASCs. In 1995 Ofwat made it clear its
unwillingness to accept further reductions in the number of independent com-
parators. Nowadays the number of water companies has fallen to 22 (10 WASCs
and 12 WOCs) and it seems that capital market competition will be operating
mainly through operations which do not involve "water-water" mergers within
the industry12 (Sawkins (2001) and Competition Commission (2002)).
Summarizing, the regulatory framework set after privatization has been sub-
ject to significant changes: the introduction of yardstick competition, the open-
ing of capital market competition to WASCs and the tightening of price caps
set in 1994 and 199913.
As far as previous empirical literature on the English and Welsh water in-
dustry is concerned, we do not report a detailed survey14, but we just mention
those few papers reporting empirical evidence on firms’ ineﬃciency and total
factor productivity after industry privatization.
Ashton (2000a) estimates an average value of ineﬃciency for the ten pri-
vatized WASCs over the period 1987-1997. Using a translog operating cost
function estimated with a random eﬀects (GLS) procedure, he finds moderate
levels of both ineﬃciency and ineﬃciency dispersion within the industry. In a
companion paper (Ashton (2000b)) he estimates a translog cost function em-
ploying a SURE procedure over the same sample period and finds a decline
in total factor productivity (TFP). In particular, he found that TFP growth
point see, among others, Bauer et al. (1998) and, for the English and Welsh water industry,
Cubbin and Tzanidakis (1998).
10Of course, this possibility is less likely as the number of regulated firms increases. This
appears to be the case of the English and Welsh water industry. See among others Tangeras
(2002) and Auriol (2000).
11The 1989 Water Act introduced also golden shares for the ten WASCs which were going
to expire in 1994.
12For details on firms demography of the sample used in this empirical work see section 3.
13There is a wide consensus on the idea that the initial caps set at privatization were too
lax (see, among others, Saal and Parker (2001a)). In particular, it was only with the 1999
price review that OFWAT imposed a real tariﬀs reduction (which implies a negative K over
the regulatory period 1999-2004).
14 See Saal and Parker (2001b) and Ashton (2003).
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declined from —0.029 % in the period 1989-91 to —0.063% in the period 1995-
97. Saal and Parker (2001b) consider the ten WASCs observed over the period
1985-1999 and estimate a two output translog total cost function in order to
assess the impact of both privatization and the 1994-5 regulatory tightening on
the growth rate of total costs. Using a non-linear SURE methodology, they do
not find any privatization eﬀect on costs but they do find a significant reduction
in the growth rate of total costs after the 1994-95 regulatory review. In another
paper, Saal and Parker (2001a) adopt an index numbers approach and find,
for the same sample, that privatization led to a significant increase in labour
productivity and that most of this increment took place after the 1994-95 reg-
ulatory review. On the other hand, data do not show significant improvements
of TFP growth after privatization and a TFP reduction after the 1994-95 price
review15.
There is also a body of literature consisting on studies sponsored and pub-
lished by Ofwat which usually reports comparative statistics on several aspects
of water companies performance (like unit costs, disconnections, leakage and
relative eﬃciency). The last 2001-02 report on unit costs and relative eﬃciency
observes, among other things, a reduction in unit operating costs and a decline
of firms’ cost ineﬃciency between 1992-93 and 2001-0216.
3 Data
The dataset used in this study consists of an unbalanced panel of 177 firm
observations on bothWater and Sewerage companies andWater Only companies
observed over the period 1995-2001. The main source of data comes from the
"June Returns for the Water and Sewerage industries in England and Wales"
published by Ofwat17 and updated at April of each year18 . In the empirical
application we focus only on the water service and we do not consider the
sewerage one.
The demography of firms included in the panel is driven by the process of
mergers and acquisitions occurred within the sample period. When mergers
took place between firms of similar size we have considered the merged entity as
a new firm entering the panel19 ; on the other side, if mergers involved companies
with considerable size diﬀerential we let the bigger survive20. For 1995 the panel
15They also find a decline in the economic profitability of WASCs after the 1994-95 regula-
tory review which they explain with the tighter price caps put into place by OFWAT.
16Those results were obtained using a sort of corrected ordinary least squares method. For
further details see OFWAT (2002).
17Other sources of data employed in this study are the WASCs and WOCs accounts and
publications on the water industry published by the Centre for the Study of Regulated Indus-
tries.
18Each year of observation starts at 1st April and ends the following 31st March.
19This is the case of the following mergers: Chester Waterwoks with Wrexham Water;
Midsouthern Water and South East Water; Northumbrian Water with Essex and Suﬀolk
Water.
20This occurred for the following acquisitions: Hartlepool Water by Anglian Water, York
Waterworks by Yorkshire Water and North Surrey Water by Threvalleys. In these cases the
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includes 28 firms (10 WASCs and 18 WOCs) which reduce to 21 (10 WASCs
and 11 WOCs) in the last year of observation21. The unbalancedness of the
panel is described in Table 1.
In Table 2 we provide some descriptive statistics on the variables used in
the empirical application. When needed, the data have been deflated with the
RPI index. Operating expenditure (opex ) is defined as operating costs less
current cost depreciation and infrastructure renewal charge; unit labour cost
(w) is obtained as the ratio between total labour costs and the number of full-
time equivalent employees; y represents output and is proxied by the amount
of water delivered; len is the length of mains; aph stands for average pumping
head; riv represents the proportion of river sources on total sources; nh is the
share of water delivered to non-households customers on total water delivered;
den is the population density; wat is our proxy for firm’s size and is defined
as distribution input, i.e. the amount of water introduced into the distribution
mains (it diﬀers from our measure of output for the existence of leakage); k
is the stock of capital proxied by the modern equivalent asset estimation of
the replacement costs of net tangible assets as provided by the "June Returns".
Saal and Parker (2001b) argue that a water industry specific Capital Cost Index
(CCI) could be more appropriate than RPI (as done by Ofwat) for adjusting
current costs replacement values; unfortunately values of the CCI for the last
years of our panel are not available.
The summary statistics show some trends that have occurred in the industry.
The average amount of both water delivered and introduced in the network
has steadily increased over the sample period, thus reflecting an increase in
water demand; moreover, the large values of standard deviations associated to y
and wat suggest the presence of wide size diﬀerentials. These diﬀerentials may
induce heteroskedasticity problems as the sources of noise, as well as ineﬃciency,
might vary with size: in our empirical application we tackle theses issues by
parametrizing both variance components of noise and ineﬃciency as a function
of firm size (see below). We can further note that, over the sample period, the
average value of net tangible assets has increased, thus denoting a moderate
investment activity in the industry. Finally Table 2 shows large variations in
the hedonic variables at firms’ levels, which reflect the presence of diﬀerent
operating conditions.
In the following section we discuss the empirical Model used for describing
firms’ cost structure and modeling possible ineﬃciency.
4 Model specification and estimation procedures
In order to analyze the evolution of ineﬃciency in the English and Welsh water
industry we adopt a stochastic cost frontier (SCF) approach. This approach
size of acquiring firms was about 80 times larger than that of acquired firms.
21Welsh Water has been discarded in 2001 since it was transformed into a mutual company
and water and sewerage services were completely out-sourced to another WASC. This creates
problems for recovering data on labour costs.
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allows to distinguish between cost reductions induced by technical change from
those deriving from eﬃciency improvements. Originally proposed by Aigner,
Lovell and Schmidt (1977) and Meeusen and Van den Broeck (1977), this
methodology assumes that deviations from the best practice frontier might be
due to both ineﬃciency and other random factors22. During the last decade
some authors have suggested diﬀerent methods for testing whether some por-
tions of ineﬃciency departure from the frontier can be systematically explained.
This issue was initially tackled with a two-step approach, by which ineﬃciency
and exogenous eﬀects were identified sequentially23. Kumbhakar et al. (1991),
Huang and Liu (1994) and Battese and Coelli (1995) proposed a one-step ap-
proach by which potential ineﬃciency determinants are estimated simultane-
ously with the other parameters of the model through the parametrization of
the mean of the pre-truncated distribution as a function of exogenous vari-
ables. Reifschneider and Stevenson (1991), Caudill and Ford (1993), Caudill et
al. (1995), and Hadri (1999) suggest another one-step approach based on the
parametrization of the variance of the pre-truncated distribution: this modeling
strategy allows also to control for heteroskedasticity problems. Finally Wang
(2002) combines the above approaches.
In this paper we adopt a cost function approach since we assume that firms
are price takers on inputs markets and that output is exogenously determined.
This appears to be the case of a regulated industry where firms are relatively
small players on inputs markets and are required to satisfy market demand at
prices set by the regulator. In particular, we consider a variable cost function
as we assume capital stock as a quasi-fixed input, since its modification in the
short run may be either not feasible or too expensive. Other studies on the
English and Welsh water industry adopt a total cost approach: in particular,
Saal and Parker (2001b) justify this choice by observing that the industry has
been subject to intense investment programs over their sample period (1985-
1999).
Nevertheless, by observing that most infrastructures needed in the water
industry are built in order to meet higher levels of demand expected in the long
run (20-30 years), it may be assumed that water utilities (though investing) are
not in long run equilibrium with respect to capital, especially when the time
span covered by the panel is short, as in our case.
Regarding the functional form, we consider a translogarithmic variable cost
function to model the technology of the English and Welsh water industry:
22For an introduction to eﬃciency and productivity analysis see, among others, Coelli et al.
(1998). See Kumbhakar and Lovell (2000) for an exhaustive analysis on stochastic frontiers.
23For the drawbacks of this procedure see Kumbhakar and Lovell (2000).
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opexit = βt + βsewdsewit +
X
j
βjpjit + βyyit + βkkit + (1)
+
X
m
βmzmit + 1/2
X
j
X
s
βjspjitpsit + 1/2βyy(yit)
2
+1/2βkk(kit)
2 + 1/2
X
m
X
r
βmrzmitzrit +
X
j
βjypjityit +
+
X
j
βjkpjitkit +
X
j
X
m
βjmpjitzmit ++
X
m
βmyzmityit +
+
X
m
βmkzmitkit + βkykityit + (vit + uit)
j, s = w, o and m, r = len, aph, riv
where opexit denotes (the logarithm of) operating expenditure for firm i at
time t. The vector of variable factor prices, P , is defined as [Pw; Po], where
the subscript w and o stands for labour and other variables inputs. The price
of other variable inputs is proxied by the RPI inedx. y denotes the volume of
water distributed and k is the capital stock. The vector Z represents technical
variables and is defined as [Zlen,Z aph,Z riv]. The dummy variable dsew takes
value one when firm i provides sewerage services alongside water supply.
The translog is a flexible functional form which approximates any twice-
diﬀerentiable function without imposing any a priori restrictions on the produc-
tion technology (Chambers (1988)).
We modified a standard variable cost function by including a set of technical
variables [Z ] and a "sewerage dummy". These variables have been included
because they may influence the technology under which water utilities operate
and may account for exogenous diﬀerences in operating environment experi-
enced by each firm (Bhattacharyya et al. (1995), Garcia and Thomas (2001),
Stewart (1993) among the others). In particular, the sewerage dummy should
pick up technology diﬀerences existing between the ten WASCs and the WOCs;
a higher average pumping head implies the extensive use of pumping especially
from groundwater sources, while a higher proportion of river sources is likely to
induce, with respect to other sources, the necessity of more advanced chemical
treatments to purify water. The inclusion of a network variable like len allows
to distinguish between economies of output density and economies of scale (see
below). Moreover, time dummies are included in the model to account for,
among other things, cyclical factors and technological progress.
To correspond to a well behave production structure, the translog cost func-
tion must satisfy a set of regularity conditions: it must be non-decreasing in
factor prices and output, linearly homogeneous in factor prices, concave and
symmetric.
Homogeneity can be imposed by normalizing the dependent variable and
factor prices with the price of one of the inputs: we normalized for the price
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of other variable inputs24, thus reducing the components of the P vector to
one. Symmetry of the cost function is imposed by assuming that βjs = βsj and
βmr = βrm before estimation. Concavity of the cost function is verified if the
Hessian is a negative semi-definite matrix, while monotonicity in factor prices
requires that costs rise as factor prices increase; finally monotonicity in output
requires positive marginal costs.
As we said above, the inclusion in the cost function of the network length
allows for the distinction of economies of output density and economies of scale.
Short run economies of output density (EODSR) are defined as the proportional
increase in variable costs brought about by a proportional increase in output,
keeping all other variables fixed (capital, network length, input prices and tech-
nical variables):
EODSR =
1
∂ lnV C/∂ ln y
(2)
In the long run the capital stock can be adjusted and long run economies of
output density (EODLR) can be computed as:
EODLR =
1− ∂ lnV C/∂ ln k
∂ lnV C/∂ ln y
(3)
Values of EOD greater (lower) than 1 imply increasing (decreasing) economies
of output density.
Short run economies of scale (SESR) are defined as the proportional increase
in variable costs brought about by a proportional increase in output and network
length holding other variables fixed:
ESSR = 1/(
∂ lnV C
∂ ln y
+
∂ lnV C
∂ ln len
) (4)
The same measure for the long run (SELR) is defined as:
ESLR = (1−
∂ lnV C
∂ ln k
)/(
∂ lnV C
∂ ln y
+
∂ lnV C
∂ ln len
) (5)
Values of ES greater (lower) than 1 imply economies (diseconomies) of scale.
The existence of economies of scale implies that average costs fall when both the
volume of water delivered and network size increase: this measure is relevant
when assessing possible cost savings deriving from the merger of two nearby
utilities.
Turning to the composite error term (vit + uit), we make the following as-
sumptions :
24This normalization procedure is equivalent to impose the following restrictions:
X
j
βj = 1;X
j
βjs = 0;
X
j
βjy = 0;
X
j
βjk = 0;
X
j
βjm = 0. See Jorgenson (1986).
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vit ∼ N(0, σ2vit) (6)
uit ∼ N+(0, σ2uit) (7)
σ2vit = exp(γ0 + γwatwatit) (8)
σ2uit = exp(δ0 + δtt+ δaphaphit + δrivrivit + (9)
+δnhnhit + δdendenit + δwatwatit)
The two sided-noise component vit accounts for measurement errors and for
other random factors, while uit is the one-sided error component associated with
cost ineﬃciency.
As we noted while describing data, our sample is characterized by large firms’
size variation: this is likely to generate heteroskedasticity problems. Unmod-
eled heteroskedasticity in the symmetric noise error component leads to biased
estimates of cost eﬃciency and unmodeled heteroskedasticity in the one-sided
cost ineﬃciency error component leads to biased estimates of the parameters
of the cost frontier and biased estimates of cost eﬃciency. In order to control
for heteroskedasticity we have parametrized variances of both error components
(σ2vit and σ
2
uit) as exponential functions of size as proxied by the variable wat.
Moreover, the variance of the ineﬃciency term has been modeled as an expo-
nential function of several hedonic variables: as pointed out by Kumbhakar and
Lovell (2000) this can be seen as an approach to study exogenous eﬀects on
ineﬃciency.
Average pumping head (aph) and River (riv) are alternatively included as
variables which might explain firms’ relative eﬃciency or as technology shifters
(i.e. as regressors in the frontier function)25. Higher values of aph reflect higher
pumping costs which should determine higher cost ineﬃciency and high values
of the variable riv are expected to raise cost ineﬃciency since water abstracted
from rivers entails larger treatment costs. nh is a proxy for the importance of
large (industrial) users: a higher proportion of large users is expected to reduce
cost ineﬃciency because it is cheaper to distribute the same amount of water
to a few large users than to an high number of small customers. Variable den
represents population density which may have ambiguous eﬀects on cost ineﬃ-
ciency: on the one hand, it may be more expensive to serve dispersed customers;
on the other hand, a higher density might create congestion problems. Finally
we included a time trend to account for time varying eﬃciency eﬀects.
Cost ineﬃciency for firm i at time t can be defined as:
CIit = exp(uit) (10)
25On this issue, diﬀerent approaches have been followed in the literature on water industry
cost structure. For example, Bhattacharyya et al. (1995a) include, among others, a dummy
variable for tipology of sources in the frontier and network lenght and a proxy for the presence
of industrial users in the ineﬃciency term. The same author, in another paper, includes the
sources dummy in the ineﬃciency term.
11
which takes values greater than one unless a firm is fully eﬃcient. In our
empirical application we obtain estimates of CIit based on the expected values
of uit conditioned on the observables but unconditional on the composite error
term26. Given that the ineﬃciency component is distributed as an half normal
with variance σ2uit, the unconditional expected value of uit is:
E(uit ) = σ
2
uit
φ(0)
Φ(0)
(11)
where φ(0) and Φ(0) are the density and the cumulative density functions
of the standard normal variable, both evaluated at the mean value of the pre-
truncated distribution of the ineﬃciency component of the error term.
In order to check the robustness of our results, our empirical strategy is
to estimate three diﬀerent models, where the hedonic variables aph and riv
alternatively enter as additional variables in the cost frontier or as variables
explaining ineﬃciency.
We label Model 1 a specification of equation (1) where the vector Z = [Zlen]
and the ineﬃciency term is parametrized as in equation (6). In Model 2 vector
Z = [Zlen, Zaph] and the variable aph is dropped from the ineﬃciency term.
Finally, for Model 3, vector Z = [Zlen, Zaph, Zriv] and both aph and riv are not
included in the ineﬃciency component.
All Models are estimated by Maximum Likelihood Method in order to simul-
taneously obtain estimates of the coeﬃcients of the stochastic cost frontier and
of variables included in equation (8) and (9). Estimates are performed using
the Stata 8 software.
5 Empirical results
In this section we discuss econometric estimates of the three empirical Mod-
els outlined above. Table 3 reports ML estimates for the parameters of the
heterosckedstic stochastic cost frontier. Since all right-hand side variables of
equation (1) have been normalized by their sample medians, first order coeﬃ-
cients can be directly interpreted as cost elasticities computed at median values.
In all Models output and wage elasticities are positive, as expected for a well-
behaved cost function. Estimates of the cost elasticity with respect to capital are
positive but not significant. This suggests that water utilities are characterized
by over-capitalization at the sample median and thus are not located on their
optimal long run equilibrium path (Caves et al. (1981), Cowing and Holtmann
(1983)): in this case a total cost function would have been misspecified. Similar
results have been found by Ashton (2003) for 20 WOCs observed between 1991-
26Being uit unobservable, its best predictor is the conditional expectation of uit given the
observable value of (vit+uit) as suggested by Jondrow et al. (1982). As noted by Wang (2002),
calculations of (cost) ineﬃciency conditional on the composite error term are intractable in a
model where heteroskedasticity is allowed in both components of the error term.
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9627. Possible explanations for this finding rest on the following arguments:
as we noted in the previous section, in the water industry most infrastructures
are built in order to meet higher levels of demand expected in the long run,
so that firms may operate well below full capacity; moreover, the regulatory
regime introduced after privatization, which is characterized by some elements
of rate of return regulation, might have induced over-capitalization through the
Averch-Johnson eﬀect (Saal and Parker (2001b)).
Cost elasticities with respect to aph and riv (included in the cost frontier
for Models 2 and 3) show that those variables significantly raise variable costs:
this result confirms the usual practice of including technical variables in the cost
function alongside output and input prices.
Time varying intercepts are not significant, except for the 2000 and 2001
dummies which are negative and significant, thus showing a downwards shift of
the cost frontier28 . This shift might have been induced by diﬀerent exogenous
factors like technical change, cyclical factors and the incentives provided by the
tighter price caps set with the 1999 regulatory review. Finally, the negative and
significant coeﬃcient on the intercept dummy dsew reflects cost advantages for
the ten WASCs which may result from the joint production of both water and
sewerage services29 .
As we noted in the previous section, the inclusion in the variable cost func-
tion of network length allows for the distinction of economies of output density
and economies of scale; moreover, since we control for the capital stock, we can
compute those two measures both for the short and the long run (see equations
(2-5)). Table 4 gives an immediate picture of estimated economies of output
density and scale economies evaluated at diﬀerent sample points. For all esti-
mated Models short run output densities are found to be significantly increasing:
this implies that average costs fall when the volume of water delivered in a ser-
vice territory of given size increases. Furthermore, in the short run, observed
firms exhibit increasing scale economies at low scale levels, with values ranging
from 1.45 to 1.73 across Models, while returns turn to be constant as firms’ size
grows. These findings seem to suggest that only mergers between small utilities
may allow cost savings in the short run30.
Most estimated economies of output densities in the long run are greater
than one (though in some cases not significantly) and, on average, decrease
with size; estimates of long run scale economies suggest that water utilities in
our sample are characterized by average variable costs which are approximately
U-shaped with respect to size. However, any possible policy implications of these
findings should be inferred with extreme caution, as our Models do not meet
the conditions which guarantee that long run elasticity measures, computed
27See also Bhattacharyya et al. (1994), Bhattacharyya et al. (1995a), Bhattacharyya et al.
(1995b) and Garcia and Thomas (2001).
28We do not report estimates results for time varying intercepts for reasons of space.
29For the English and Welsh water and sewerage industry empirical evidence on the existence
of scope economies between water and sewerage services is mixed. See Hunt and Lynk (1995)
and Saal and Parker (2001b).
30 Similar results are found, among others, by Garcia and Thomas (2001) for a panel of
French water utilities.
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as in equations (3) and (5), match those derived from a total cost function31.
As pointed out by Braeutigam and Daughety (1983), this happens to be the
case only if the technology is homothetic or if fixed factors are at their cost
minimizing levels32.
In order to check if the translogarithmic functional form described in equa-
tion (1) gives an adequate representation of the cost structure of our sample
of firms, we run generalized likelihood ratio tests on the restrictions implied by
homotheticity (βwy = βwlen = βwk = 0) and by a Cobb-Douglas specification
(βjs = βyy = βkk = βmr = βjy = βjk = βjm = βmy = βmk = βky = 0). LR
tests results reported in Table 5 allows to reject both restrictions in all estimated
Models. Moreover, an LR test is also performed to test the null hypothesis that
all years eﬀects are jointly equal to zero: estimations of restricted Models failed
to converge for Models 1 and 2, while for Model 3 the hypothesis of no year
eﬀects is strongly rejected. Nevertheless, as we noted by discussing parameters
punctual estimates, there seem to be significant year eﬀects for the last two
years of the sample period.
The lower part of Table 5 reports LR tests for restrictions imposed on the
structure adopted for each component of the error term (equations (8) and
(9)). The hypothesis of homosckedasticity in the two-sided noise component vit
(γwat = 0) is rejected for both Models 1 and 2 and this result is confirmed by the
significance of the coeﬃcients of the parameter γwat, observable in Table 3. This
findings support our parametrization of the variance of the noise component as
the sources of noise seem to vary with firms’ size. For Model 3 results are
not definitive, since γwat is not statistically diﬀerent from zero, and the LR
test could not be computed as the homosckedastic restricted Model failed to
converge.
Turning to the one-side error component uit, the LR tests suggest that the
ineﬃciency component is heteroskedastic, as the hypothesis that all parameters
(excluding constant) in equation (9) are jointly zero can be rejected for Model
1 and 2. Moreover, this result implies that deviations from the best practice
frontier are not entirely due to noise so that stochastic ineﬃciency exists and is
a function of the variables included in equation (9).
In the lower part of Table 3 we report estimated coeﬃcients associated with
variables included in the ineﬃciency model. The size variable (wat) is significant
only for Model 3 and its negative sign implies that ineﬃciency decreases with
size. "Eﬃciency drivers" related to the composition of the customers base are
represented by nh and den. Population density has a positive impact on cost
eﬃciency in all Models, since its coeﬃcient is negatively signed: higher levels
31For a correct computation of long run elasticities see Schankerman and Nadiri (1986) and
Salvanes and Tjotta (1994).
32Table 5 reports results of LR tests on the hypothesis of homotheticity.
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of population density are thus associated with higher levels of cost eﬃciency33.
On the other hand, the proxy for the importance of large (industrial) users (nh)
is significant only for Model 1 and has a negative sign, as expected.
Variables aph and riv account for exogenous factors connected with geo-
graphical characteristics of the service area. Higher levels of average pumping
head raise cost ineﬃciency when included as an explanatory variable for ineﬃ-
ciency (Model 1) and a higher proportion of river sources is found to increase
cost ineﬃciency (Model 1 and 2).
In order to analyze the time pattern of ineﬃciency we have included a trend
variable in the ineﬃciency component. Estimate results show the existence of a
decreasing path of ineﬃciency over the sample period, as the coeﬃcient related
to trend is significantly negative in all Models. This ineﬃciency pattern is clearly
identified by the analysis of average ineﬃciency scores computed according to
equation (10)34.
Giving a picture of the evolution of eﬃciency for the whole English and
Welsh water industry after the first 1994 price review is indeed the major con-
tribution of this study. In fact, previous literature focused either on the ten
water and sewerage companies or on the water only companies; moreover, there
is not any previous evidence on the behavior of average industry ineﬃciency over
time and on ineﬃciency dispersion across firms. In fact, a few studies (Ashton
(2000b) and Saal and Parker (2001a and 2001b)) provide evidence on total factor
productivity change, but they do not distinguish the contribution of eﬃciency
change and of technical change. Finally, this is the first paper which employs
an heteroskedastic stochastic frontier methodology to estimate cost ineﬃciency
for the English and Welsh water industry.
Table 6 reports estimated average cost ineﬃciency for each year: aggregate
results show a monotonic decline of ineﬃciency over the sample period in all
Models; in particular, ineﬃciency scores range from 1.15 to 1.095, from 1.094
to 1.046 and from 1.16 to 1.077 for Model 1, 2 and 3 respectively, which imply
a cost ineﬃciency reduction of about 5% between 1995 and 2001. In order to
check the statistical significance of this result we run a non parametric Kruskal-
Wallis test which rejected the null hypothesis that median scores for each year
are jointly equal.
Moreover, the analysis of standard deviations reported in Table 6 gives in-
teresting insights on the evolution of ineﬃciency dispersion across firms: they
decrease over time and, on average, range from 0.08 in 1995 to 0.03 in 2001.
This finding suggests that ineﬃciency diﬀerentials among water utilities have
reduced over the sample period in all Models and this is confirmed by observing
the pattern of mean relative cost ineﬃciency showed in Table 7. In order to ob-
33Similar results have been obtained by Fabbri and Fraquelli (2000) for a sample of Italian
water utilities and by Evrard et al. (1994) for a sample of Belgian water utilities. Ashton
(2003) includes a density variable in the cost function but it resulted to be not significant.
34The amount by which the ineﬃciency score exceeds one reflects the extent of possible cost
savings.
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tain this relative measure, we have divided each firm’s ineﬃciency level by the
minimum score observed in each year, thus obtaining an ineﬃciency measure
which shows the distance between each firm and the less ineﬃcient one. The
steady decline of mean relative cost ineﬃciency over time suggests the existence
of catch-up eﬀects among firms: water utilities characterized by higher levels of
ineﬃciency in 1995 have obtained larger eﬃciency gains with respect to other
firms. A Kruskal-Wallis test confirms this findings.
Overall results seem to show that not only has industry average ineﬃciency
level reduced over the sample period, but also that ineﬃciency diﬀerentials
among firms have shrunk. These empirical findings may be linked to changes
in the competitive environment occurred within the sample period, as diﬀerent
factors might have caused a tightening in competitive pressure faced by water
utilities.
As we noted in Section 2, with the 1994 price review, yardstick competition
was introduced for the first time in the industry. This change in the regulatory
framework was expected to induce eﬃciency gains and to generate sharper in-
centives for the most ineﬃcient firms such that each firm’s costs should have
converged to the industry minimum. Moreover, capital market competition be-
came fully operative after 1994 when golden shares on WASCs were removed
and take-over threats were extended to the whole industry thus providing fur-
ther incentives to reduce possible slacks. Finally, our sample period includes
the 1994 and 1999 price reviews which set tighter price caps in order to induce
additional cost savings incentives.
In general terms, a possible explanation of our empirical findings rests on
the eﬃciency enhancing eﬀect brought about by "regulated" competition.
Our results strenghten the evidence provided by Ofwat (2000b) which reports
comparative statistics on several performance indicators over the period 1990-
2000 and shows that they improved over time; moreover, variances of those
measures reduced over the same period. Sawkins (2001) consider these results
as empirical evidence which supports the eﬃcacy of comparative competition.
Additional evidence on the eﬀects of changes in the regulatory environment
on firms’ eﬃciency could be provided by directly comparing our ineﬃciency
measures with those obtained from a control sample: unfortunately we were not
able to extend our sample to previous years since data on several variables used
in our empirical specification were not available; at the same time it is very
diﬃcult to find an adequate comparator sample of water utilities operating in a
similar institutional setting.
6 Conclusions
The last decade has been characterized by significant changes in the regulatory
environment faced by water utilities in the English and Welsh water industry.
The 1994 introduction of yardstick competition and the complete opening up
of the industry to capital market competition was expected to provide proper
incentives for firms to cut costs and to reduce X-ineﬃciency. Surprisingly, em-
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pirical evidence on this issue is scant.
In this study we analyze the evolution of cost ineﬃciency for the English
and Welsh water industry over the period 1995-2001. The most important
findings of this paper can be summarized as follows: average cost ineﬃciency
has steadely decreased over time and ineﬃciency diﬀerentials among regulated
water companies have constantly reduced. The average level of cost ineﬃciency
reached by the English and Welsh water utilities can be considered relatively
low35, hence, we may argue that further reductions in operating costs may have
to be generated mainly by technical progress and other factors which can induce
shifts in the frontier.
The major novelties of this study, with respect to previous literature on
the English and Welsh water industry, rest on the sample used and on the
empirical approach. In fact, we consider the whole water industry and we apply
an heteroskedastic stochastic cost frontier approach which allows to control for
both heteroskedasticity and for possible eﬀects of exogenous variables on firms’
ineﬃciency; moreover we provide empirical evidence on the evolution of average
cost ineﬃciency over time as well as on eﬃciency gaps among water utilities.
This paper might be extended in diﬀerent directions: it would be interesting
to check the robustness of our results with respect to diﬀerent distributional
assumptions on the ineﬃciency component and to alternative approaches to
evaluate cost ineﬃciency; moreover, after extending the sample period, it would
be worth to estimate a total cost function in order to analyze total cost ineﬃ-
ciency and compare it with our results on operative cost eﬃciency.
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Tab. 1: Panel Structure
Yea r s o f o b s . N o .o f fi rm s O b s .
7 1 8 1 2 6
6 1 6
5 7 3 5
2 5 1 0
To t a l O b s e r va t io n s 1 7 7
Tab. 2: Descriptive Statistics
Yea r o p e x ( 1 ) w (2 ) y ( 3 ) le n ( 4 ) k ( 5 )
1 9 9 5 3 8 .8 8 ( 4 5 .3 0 ) 1 4 .9 4 ( 1 .5 3 ) 4 8 7 .0 5 ( 5 7 5 .3 8 ) 1 1 4 0 4 .2 9 ( 1 2 7 3 5 .3 9 ) 1 4 5 1 .1 9 ( 1 8 1 6 .0 5 )
1 9 9 6 3 6 .4 8 ( 4 2 .3 9 ) 1 4 .9 8 ( 1 .4 4 ) 4 7 5 .9 1 ( 5 6 5 .9 8 ) 1 1 4 5 8 .4 6 ( 1 2 7 9 9 .9 8 ) 1 4 6 9 .1 7 ( 1 8 3 7 .2 1 )
1 9 9 7 3 7 .8 2 ( 4 1 .4 2 ) 1 4 .5 5 ( 1 .3 4 ) 4 9 9 .5 7 ( 5 5 3 .9 9 ) 1 2 4 9 7 .5 ( 1 3 0 9 7 .4 5 ) 1 5 9 4 .4 1 ( 1 8 9 2 .3 1 )
1 9 9 8 3 6 .7 6 ( 4 0 .3 2 ) 1 4 .5 3 ( 1 .7 6 ) 4 8 7 .1 5 ( 5 3 8 .8 2 ) 1 2 5 5 7 ( 1 3 1 7 9 .9 7 ) 1 5 9 2 .0 9 ( 1 8 9 3 .1 1 )
1 9 9 9 3 7 .7 6 ( 4 1 .7 7 ) 1 5 .1 2 ( 2 .3 4 ) 4 9 2 .4 2 (5 5 4 .8 8 1 ) 1 2 6 3 8 .8 8 ( 1 3 3 1 3 .8 1 ) 1 5 7 5 .8 7 ( 1 8 4 5 .1 5 )
2 0 0 0 4 0 .0 7 ( 3 9 .6 0 ) 1 4 .8 0 ( 1 .9 8 ) 5 8 0 .3 6 ( 5 9 6 .1 1 ) 1 4 9 8 8 ( 1 4 0 7 7 .3 9 ) 1 8 5 7 .5 9 ( 1 9 3 6 .6 7 )
2 0 0 1 3 8 .0 9 ( 3 9 .3 7 ) 1 5 .0 7 ( 1 .8 ) 5 7 9 .6 6 ( 6 1 3 .7 ) 1 4 5 6 4 .1 5 ( 1 4 4 3 0 .1 1 ) 1 7 9 5 .6 8 ( 1 9 6 1 .8 9 )
To t a l 3 7 .8 4 ( 4 0 .9 6 ) 1 4 .8 5 ( 1 .7 5 ) 5 1 0 .5 2 ( 5 6 1 .5 1 ) 1 2 7 4 4 .4 7 ( 1 3 1 5 6 .5 3 ) 1 6 0 5 .4 7 ( 1 8 5 1 .8 )
Tab. 2 (continued): Descriptive Statistics
Ye a r a p h ( 6 ) r iv ( 7 ) n h ( 8 ) d e n ( 9 ) w a t ( 1 0 )
1 9 9 5 1 1 8 .4 7 ( 3 3 .9 ) 0 .4 ( 0 .3 ) 0 .2 8 (0 .0 6 ) 0 .4 7 ( 0 .2 7 ) 6 0 8 .0 8 ( 7 6 3 .0 8 )
1 9 9 6 1 2 3 .0 3 ( 3 6 .0 4 ) 0 .3 9 ( 0 .3 0 ) 0 .2 9 (0 .0 6 ) 0 .4 8 ( 0 .2 6 ) 5 8 4 .4 6 ( 7 2 9 .5 1 )
1 9 9 7 1 2 7 .5 8 ( 3 9 .9 4 ) 0 .3 8 ( 0 .3 0 ) 0 .2 9 (0 .0 5 ) 0 .4 8 ( 0 .2 7 ) 6 0 3 .2 9 ( 6 9 9 .9 7 )
1 9 9 8 1 2 3 .4 2 ( 3 5 .3 7 ) 0 .3 7 ( 0 .3 0 ) 0 .3 0 (0 .0 6 ) 0 .4 8 ( 0 .2 7 ) 5 7 9 .0 8 ( 6 6 2 .5 7 )
1 9 9 9 1 2 6 .3 9 ( 3 6 .2 5 ) 0 .3 7 ( 0 .3 0 ) 0 .2 9 (0 .0 6 ) 0 .4 8 ( 0 .2 7 ) 5 7 9 .1 4 ( 6 6 8 .1 4 )
2 0 0 0 1 3 0 .2 8 ( 3 4 .5 3 ) 0 .3 3 ( 0 .2 6 ) 0 .2 9 (0 .0 5 ) 0 .4 4 ( 0 .2 4 ) 6 8 2 .0 5 ( 7 1 6 .7 6 )
2 0 0 1 1 2 7 .0 6 ( 3 4 .9 9 ) 0 .3 4 ( 0 .2 5 ) 0 .2 9 (0 .0 5 ) 0 .4 6 ( 0 .2 5 ) 6 8 3 .8 3 ( 7 5 5 .8 3 )
To t a l 1 2 4 .9 1 ( 3 5 .5 4 ) 0 .3 7 ( 0 .2 8 ) 0 .2 9 (0 .0 5 ) 0 .4 7 ( 0 .2 6 ) 6 1 3 .3 1 ( 7 0 2 .3 1 )
N o t e s : s t a n d a rd d e v ia t io n in b r a ck e t s
1 ) o p e ra t iv e e x p e n d i t u r e (m i l l io n s o f G B £ )
2 ) la b o u r c o s t s ( th o u s a n d s o f G B £ )
3 ) w a t e r d e l iv e r e d , M e g a l i t r e s / d ay.
4 ) l e n g th o f m a in s , KM .
5 ) C a p i t a l s t o ck , m i l l io n s o f G B £ .
6 ) ave r a g e p um p in g h e a d
7 ) n um b e r o f r iv e r s o u r c e s / t o t a l s o u r c e s
8 ) w a t e r d e l iv e r e d t o n o n h o u s eh o ld s / w a t e r d e l iv e r e d
9 0 ) p o p u la t io n d e n s i ty
1 0 ) d is t r ib u t io n in p u t , M eg a l i t r e s / d ay
22
Tab. 3: ML estimates for the parameters of the SCF
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
β0 c o n s t a n t - 0 .0 9 ( 0 .0 1 7 ) -0 .0 4 (0 .0 2 ) -0 .0 4 7 ( 0 .0 2 )
βdsew d um sew e ra g e -0 .2 3 7 ( 0 .0 2 5 ) -0 .1 6 6 ( 0 .0 2 6 ) -0 .2 2 1 ( 0 .0 1 6 )
βw wa g e 0 .2 7 ( 0 .0 8 3 ) 0 .1 9 1 ( 0 .0 9 6 ) 0 .3 5 3 ( 0 .0 5 2 )
βk c a p i t a l 0 .0 0 3 ( 0 .0 8 ) 0 .0 8 8 ( 0 .1 0 5 ) 0 .0 9 6 ( 0 .0 8 )
βy o u tp u t 0 .7 4 7 ( 0 .0 6 6 ) 0 .6 5 2 ( 0 .0 4 4 ) 0 .6 6 5 ( 0 .0 2 6 )
βlen l e n g h t 0 .3 0 8 ( 0 .0 9 8 ) 0 .2 4 3 ( 0 .1 1 2 ) 0 .2 0 9 ( 0 .0 9 2 )
βaph aph - 0 .2 3 6 ( 0 .0 3 2 ) 0 .1 6 9 ( 0 .0 2 6 )
βriv r iv e r - - 0 .0 3 9 ( 0 .0 0 9 )
βww (w a g e ) (w a g e ) 1 .6 6 8 ( 0 .5 5 1 ) 0 .7 6 ( 0 .5 9 3 ) 1 .4 8 4 ( 0 .5 7 )
βwk (w a g e ) ( c a p it a l ) - 0 .2 3 ( 0 .3 8 ) -0 .3 5 3 ( 0 .4 4 1 ) 0 .7 9 1 ( 0 .3 2 6 )
βwy (w a g e ) ( o u tp u t ) 0 .2 2 7 ( 0 .3 1 3 ) 0 .0 8 1 ( 0 .3 5 3 ) -0 .5 4 2 ( 0 .2 3 7 )
βwlen (w a g e ) ( le n g h t ) -0 .1 7 3 ( 0 .3 8 5 ) 0 .0 1 2 ( 0 .5 1 5 ) -0 .5 2 1 ( 0 .3 3 6 )
βwaph (w a g e ) (aph ) - - 0 .3 2 7 ( 0 .2 1 5 ) -0 .2 9 6 ( 0 .1 3 7 )
βwriv (w a g e ) ( r iv e r ) - - - 0 .0 5 5 ( 0 .0 4 6 )
βkk ( c a p i t a l ) ( c a p it a l ) - 1 .5 3 9 ( 0 .4 6 2 ) -0 .4 5 9 ( 0 .5 3 9 ) -1 .6 4 7 ( 0 .3 8 6 )
βky ( c a p i t a l ) ( o u tp u t ) 0 .7 9 ( 0 .2 4 1 ) 0 .3 4 4 ( 0 .2 1 1 ) -0 .0 5 3 ( 0 .1 6 3 )
βklen ( c a p i t a l ) ( l e n g h t ) 0 .8 4 1 ( 0 .3 9 8 ) 0 .0 7 5 (0 .5 2 ) 1 .5 3 6 ( 0 .4 1 )
βkaph ( c a p i t a l ) (aph ) - 0 .1 2 5 ( 0 .1 7 4 ) -0 .0 5 9 ( 0 .1 5 6 )
βkriv ( c a p i t a l ) ( r iv e r ) - - 0 .2 1 2 ( 0 .0 0 8 )
βyy ( o u tp u t ) ( o u tp u t ) 0 .1 0 8 ( 0 .1 9 6 ) 0 .1 4 7 ( 0 .2 2 3 ) 1 .3 2 2 ( 0 .1 8 2 )
βylen ( o u tp u t ) ( le n g h t ) -0 .8 5 7 ( 0 .3 7 6 ) -0 .3 1 4 ( 0 .2 9 1 ) -1 .1 9 6 ( 0 .2 0 3 )
βyaph ( o u tp u t ) (aph ) - - 0 .3 2 8 ( 0 .1 1 7 ) -0 .0 7 8 ( 0 .1 5 1 )
βyriv ( o u tp u t ) ( r iv e r ) - - 0 .0 1 9 ( 0 .0 1 9 )
βlenlen ( le n g h t ) ( le n g h t ) -0 .0 0 4 ( 0 .4 9 4 ) 0 .2 2 1 ( 0 .6 1 8 ) -0 .1 1 6 ( 0 .5 1 5 )
βlenaph ( le n g h t ) (aph ) - 0 .0 9 1 ( 0 .2 1 5 ) -0 .0 0 3 ( 0 .2 1 1 )
βlenriv ( le n g h t ) ( r iv e r ) - - - 0 .1 9 5 ( 0 .0 1 3 )
βaphaph (aph ) (aph ) - 0 .2 7 5 ( 0 .0 5 9 ) 0 .2 4 9 ( 0 .0 3 4 )
βaphriv (aph ) ( r iv e r ) - - - 0 .0 7 1 ( 0 .0 1 8 )
βrivriv ( r iv e r ) ( r iv e r ) - - - 0 .0 1 6 ( 0 .0 0 3 )
γ0 c o n s t a n t - 1 0 .6 5 4 ( 0 .9 2 6 ) -6 .9 2 7 ( 0 .4 9 3 ) -2 5 .8 9 4 ( 1 1 .7 5 8 )
γwat d i s t in p u t -3 .1 8 8 ( 0 .4 1 7 ) -1 .5 1 9 ( 0 .3 4 4 ) -0 .2 1 3 ( 8 .6 5 2 )
δ0 c o n s t a n t - 3 .2 3 ( 0 .3 3 2 ) -4 .4 7 1 ( 0 .7 6 9 ) -3 .3 4 ( 0 .2 4 5 )
δt t r e n d -0 .1 4 8 ( 0 .0 7 6 ) -0 .1 9 7 (0 .1 2 ) -0 .2 1 2 ( 0 .0 5 8 )
δaph aph 2 .1 0 1 ( 0 .5 2 6 ) - -
δnh nh - 1 .4 9 ( 0 .8 4 ) 0 .3 2 8 ( 1 .5 0 2 ) 1 .0 6 3 ( 0 .7 2 3 )
δwat d i s t r . in p u t -0 .0 6 9 ( 0 .2 0 8 ) 0 .6 8 1 ( 0 .4 6 7 ) -0 .2 1 2 ( 0 .0 8 7 )
δden d e n s i ty - 0 .8 6 9 ( 0 .2 5 ) -1 .8 0 2 ( 0 .3 8 2 ) -1 .1 1 3 ( 0 .2 1 4 )
δriv r iv e r 0 .0 9 1 ( 0 .0 6 ) 1 .5 7 1 ( 0 .6 5 4 ) -
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Tab. 4: Economies of Scale and Output Density
Model1 Model2 Model 3
25 p e r c e n t i l e
E O D sr - 1 0 .8 7 8 ( 3 .2 7 ) 1 .0 3 1 ( 3 .6 1 ) 0 .2 9 5 ( 4 .1 5 )
S Esr - 1 0 .6 0 5 ( 2 .9 5 ) 0 .4 5 4 ( 2 .5 3 ) 0 .7 2 8 ( 2 .9 3 )
E O D lr - 1 0 .2 6 3 ( 1 .0 9 ) 0 .5 1 2 ( 2 .0 6 ) -0 .1 3 0 ( -1 .7 7 )
S E lr - 1 0 .7 9 ( 2 .5 9 ) 0 .0 8 2 ( 3 .0 7 ) 0 .1 6 0 ( 3 .7 7 )
5 0 p e r c e n t i l e
E O D sr - 1 0 .3 3 8 ( 2 .8 4 ) 0 .5 3 2 ( 5 .1 1 ) 0 .5 0 2 ( 8 .4 9 )
S Esr - 1 - 0 .0 5 3 ( -0 .6 1 ) 0 .1 1 6 ( 0 .8 0 ) 0 .1 4 3 ( 1 .2 6 )
E O D lr - 1 0 .3 3 2 ( 2 .4 3 ) 0 .3 9 7 ( 2 .4 3 ) 0 .3 5 7 ( 2 .6 5 )
S E lr - 1 - 0 .0 5 6 ( -5 .2 3 ) 0 .0 1 7 ( 0 .9 4 ) 0 .0 3 2 ( 2 .4 6 )
7 5 p e r c e n t i l e
E O D sr - 1 0 .3 2 8 ( 4 .3 3 ) 0 .3 2 3 ( 4 .4 1 ) 0 .4 1 5 ( 5 .1 3 )
S Esr - 1 0 .0 2 6 ( 0 .7 1 ) 0 .0 1 1 ( 0 .1 5 ) 0 .0 8 8 ( 1 .2 4 )
E O D lr - 1 0 .0 9 4 ( 1 .2 8 ) 0 .2 2 1 ( 2 .7 4 ) 0 .1 8 7 ( 2 .5 9 )
S E lr - 1 - 0 .1 5 4 ( -1 3 .1 8 ) -0 .0 6 6 ( -3 .7 8 ) -1 .8 5 4 ( -1 7 .0 7 )
Tab. 5: LR tests for the parameters of the SCF
N u ll hy p o th e s i s Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
H om o th e t i c i ty 1 3 .8 4 ( 3 ) 1 5 .7 2 ( 4 ) 3 5 .1 5 ( 5 )
C o b b -D o u g la s 7 4 .1 4 (1 0 ) f . c . 1 7 5 .1 7 ( 2 1 )
N o y e a r eﬀ e c t s f . c . f . c . 7 5 .8 6 ( 6 )
H om o sk ed a s t ic i ty in vit 2 7 .6 9 ( 1 ) 4 9 .7 8 ( 1 ) f . c .
H om o sk ed a s t ic i ty in uit 3 2 .3 3 ( 6 ) 3 6 .8 4 ( 5 ) f . c .
N o t e s : f . c . = fa i le d t o c o n ve r g e
Tab. 6: Mean Cost Ineﬃciency by Year
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
1 9 9 5 1 .1 5 0 ( 0 .0 6 8 ) 1 .0 9 4 ( 0 .0 9 9 ) 1 .1 6 0 ( 0 .0 7 2 )
1 9 9 6 1 .1 4 0 ( 0 .0 6 4 ) 1 .0 8 4 ( 0 .0 8 9 ) 1 .1 3 9 ( 0 .0 5 5 )
1 9 9 7 1 .1 3 1 ( 0 .0 5 9 ) 1 .0 7 7 ( 0 .0 8 3 ) 1 .1 2 3 ( 0 .0 4 6 )
1 9 9 8 1 .1 1 6 ( 0 .0 5 3 ) 1 .0 6 6 ( 0 .0 7 2 ) 1 .1 1 1 ( 0 .0 4 1 )
1 9 9 9 1 .1 1 1 ( 0 .0 5 1 ) 1 .0 5 9 ( 0 .0 6 4 ) 1 .0 9 8 ( 0 .0 3 6 )
2 0 0 0 1 .1 0 9 ( 0 .0 4 4 ) 1 .0 5 7 ( 0 .0 6 3 ) 1 .0 8 9 ( 0 .0 3 3 )
2 0 0 1 1 .0 9 5 ( 0 .0 3 6 ) 1 .0 4 6 ( 0 .0 4 2 ) 1 .0 7 7 ( 0 .0 2 9 )
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Tab. 7: Mean Relative Cost Ineﬃciency by Year
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
1 9 9 5 1 .1 0 5 1 .0 9 4 1 .0 8 8
1 9 9 6 1 .0 9 8 1 .0 8 4 1 .0 7 6
1 9 9 7 1 .0 9 3 1 .0 7 7 1 .0 6 5
1 9 9 8 1 .0 8 1 1 .0 6 6 1 .0 5 8
1 9 9 9 1 .0 8 0 1 .0 5 9 1 .0 5 1
2 0 0 0 1 .0 6 9 1 .0 5 7 1 .0 4 8
2 0 0 1 1 .0 5 3 1 .0 4 6 1 .0 4 2
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